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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF STRIKERS UNDER
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT$
KEITH

M

W.

BLINN*

public discussion has been stirred by the enactment
of the Taft-Hartley Act,' which amended certain provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.2 On one hand, it
has been praised by many as a panacea for all the existing
industrial relation ills and on the other hand it has been
severely condemned from certain quarters as a "Slave Labor
Act"; thus, it would seem timely to reappraise certain employee rights in an effort to determine the true impact of the
amended Act on those rights. The scope of this article is limited to a survey and analysis under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, of the rights and obligations of employees engaging in strikes and concerted refusals to work
and the correlative rights and duties of employers whose employees are engaging in a strike. It does not include a discussion of the problems connected with the rights of labor organization and its agents to encourage or induce employees to
engage in certain strikes and refusals to perform services
which are expressly forbidden by Section 8 (b) (4) of the
amended Act. The writer fully appreciates that various portions of the amended Act must necessarily await judicial interpretation of their exact meaning; however, with an understanding of the decided cases under the Wagner Act on this
subject and an appropriate appreciation of the Board's rationale on fundamental concepts together with the legislative
history of the amendments, it is possible to suggest something
of the effects of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
upon the right to strike.
UCH

EMPLOYEE STATUS DURING STRIKE

At the outset it should be noted that Section 7 of the amended
Act, which declares the rights of employees, expressly protects
the right to engage in concerted activity by providing:
t This article was.published in 13 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1948).
* Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. Formerly Attorney, National
Labor Relations Board.
1 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (June 23, 1947).
"49 STAT. 449 (1935), 39 U.S.C. I§ 151-166 (1940).
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"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of emplyoment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3)."
It should be observed as significant that Section 7 of the
Wagner Act was amended to protect equally ". . the right to
refrain from any or all such activities .. " Likewise, although
Section 13 of the amended Act expressly safeguards to employees the right to strike, it acknowledges some restrictions
and limitations on the right by providing:
"Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
The amended Act further declares that employees engaged
in a strike do not lose their status as employees since by virtue
of Section 2(3) the term employee is defined as including
".... any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because
of any unfair labor practice. . . ." Exception to this rule is
made by virtue of Section 8(d) of the amended Act, wherein
a labor organization representing employees under a collective
bargaining contract is required to take certain affirmative action, including serving a written notice upon the other party
to the contract of any proposed termination or modification of
the contract sixty days before the expiration date of the contract or, if the contract has no expiration date, sixty days
3 For a discussion of the factors prompting this change see the report of

Senate-House conference committee. H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Seas.,
93 Cong. Rec. 6451, 6462 (June 3, 1947).
' By way of comparison § 13 of the Wagner Act provided: "Nothing in this
Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way

the right to strike."
5 With respect to the term employ/ee as used in the Wagner Act, the Senate
committee report stated: "...
The bill thus observes the principles that men do,
not lose their right to be considered employees for the purpose of this bill merely
by collectively refraining from work during the course of a labor controversy.
Recognition that strikers may retain their status as employees has frequently
occurred in judicial decisions. . . . To hold otherwise for the purpose of this bill
would be to withdraw the government from the field at the very point where the
process of collective bargaining has reached a critical stage and where the public
interest has mounted to its highest point." Sen. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st
Seas. (1935).
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before the proposed date of termination or modification. Those
employees who engage in a strike within the above sixty day
period lose their status as employees for the purposes of Sections 8, 9, and 10 of the amended Act until such time as they
are re-employed by the employer. Accordingly, the Board and
the courts have held uniformly that the fact that an employee
engages in a concerted refusal to work does not thereby terminate his employee status.' With the exceptions hereinafter
noted under which the employer is justified in discharging the
employees, the employer remains obligated to bargain with the
labor organization which represents a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit despite the fact that the employees, who are members of that union, are engaged in a
7
strike.
RIGHT TO REPLACE STRIKERS

Since under the Wagner Act the Board and the courts recognized that the rights of both the employer and the striker
differ in unfair labor practice strikes and economic strikes, it
is well to distinguish between them. The former includes not
only those caused by the employer's unfair labor practices 1
but those prolonged as a result of the employer's unfair labor
practices.' The latter is a strike which is neither caused nor
prolonged by the unfair labor practices of the employer.
In the economic strike, the striking employees could be permanently replaced and the employer need not discharge those
employees hired to fill the places of the strikers in order to
provide places for the strikers when they elect to return to
work." For the'employer to take advantage of this right, the
f N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); M. H
Ritzwoller Co. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F. 2d 432 (C.C.A. 7th 1940).
7Hamilton v. N.L.R.B., 160 F. 2d 465, 468 (C.C.A. 6th 1947), cert. denied,
sub nom. Kalamazoo Stationery Co. v. N.L.R.B., 68 Sup. Ct. 65 (1947); N.L.R.B.
v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F. 2d 874, 885 (C.C.A. 1st 1941), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 595 (1941); Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. N.L.R.B., 91 F. 2d 134 (C.C.A.
4th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937).
8 Berkshire Knitting Mills v. N.L.R.B., 139 F. 2d 134, 137 (C.C.A. 3rd 1943),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 747 (1944); Matter of Fast Trucking, Inc., 56 N.L.R.B.
1826, 1840 (1944).
9 N.L.R.B. v. A. Sartorius .4 Co., 140 F. 2d 203, 206 (C.C.A. 2nd 1944); Black
Diamond S. S. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 94 F. 2d 875, 879 (C.C.A. 2nd 1938), cert. denied,
304 U.S. 579 (1937); Matter of Birmingham Post Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 206
(1943), enforced, 140 F. 2d 638 (C.C.A. 5th 1944).
10 N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Home
Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 159 F. 2d 280 (C.C.A. 4th 1947), eert. denied,
68 Sup. Ct. 58 (1947); N.L.R.B. v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F. 2d 542
(C.C.A. 10th 1944); Wilson & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 120 F. 2d 913 (C.C.A. 7th 1941);
N.L.R.B. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 119 F. 2d 379 (C.C.A. 8th 1941).
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replacements must be permanent and not merely a transfer
of employees from other departments in a "makeshift arrangement." 11However, upon the termination of the strike and the
unconditional offer to return to work by the strikers, the employer may not refuse to reinstate the strikers merely because
of their participation in the strike.'2 But it was held consistently that unfair labor practice strikers could not be permanently replaced and that the employer must reinstate all such
strikers upon the termination of the strike.1 Thus, where the
strike was not caused by the employer's unfair labor practices,
but the commission of such practices during the course of the
strike resulted in prolonging the controversy, the employer
was required to discharge employees hired after the commission of the unfair labor practices to make room for the returning strikers but was not required to discharge those employees
hired to replace the strikers prior to the commission of the
unfair labor practices.' 4 The legislative history of the TaftHartley Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to abolish
the different treatment accorded unfair labor practice strikers
from that accorded economic strikers and that each should
retain employee status only until replaced. ' Such a change
cuts a deep gash into the decision law established through the
administration of the Wagner Act.
The striking employee must generally apply for reinstatement upon termination of the strike or upon his personal
11 Firth Carpet Co. v. N.L.R.B., 129 F. 2d 633 (C.C.A. 2nd 1942).
12 Hamilton v. N.L.R.B., 160 F. 2d 465, 469 (C.C.A. 6th 1947), cert. denied,
sub. nom. Kalamazoo Stationery Co. vs. N.L.R.B., 68 Sup. Ct. 65 (1947); Home
Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 159 F. 2d 280 (C.C.A. 4th 1947), cert. denied,
68 Sup. Ct. 58 (1947) ; Carter Carburetor Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 140 F. 2d 714 (C.C.A.
8th 1944).
13 N.L.R.B. v. A. Sartorius & Co., Inc., 140 F. 2d 203 (C.C.A. 2d 1944);
Rapid Roller Co. v. N.L.R.B., 126 F.2d 452 (C.C.A. 7th 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 650 (1942).
14 Black Diamond S. S. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 94 F. 2d 875 (C.C.A.
2nd 1938),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 579 (1937).
I.,
In connection with the change suggested by the House bill in the definition
of the term "employee" so that economic strikers and unfair labor practice
strikers would betreated in the same fashion, the report states: ". . . This Board
practice has had the effect of treating more favorably employees striking to
remedy practices for which the National Labor Relations Act itself provides a
peaceful administrative remedy, than employees who are striking merely to better their terms of employment .... The report in advising that the House suggestion was not adopted concludes: ". . . Since the different treatment of unfair
labor practice strikers and econumic strikers is simply within the framework of
the existing law, it was thought by the House managers that the Board should
be given an opportunity to hange this practice itself rather than needlessly
complicating the definition of the term 'employee.' " H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 93 Cong. Rec. 6451, 6460 (June 3, 1947).
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desire to abandon the strike and return to work, regardless
of whether the strike is designated an unfair labor practice
strike or an economic strike. There is no particular form essential to fulfill the requisite application for reinstatement except
that it must not be conditional. It may be made by the strikers
individually, collectively or through a representative such as
the union organizer.-t However, if the employer has in fact
discharged the striking employee for his participation in the
strike or concerted activity, there is no duty on the employee
to apply for reinstatement since the unfair labor practice is
complete and the employer has a resulting affirmative duty to
offer reinstatement as in the case of any other "discriminatory
discharge." In addition, striking employees may be relieved of
the necessity of applying for reinstatement where the evidence
indicates that the employer has a well defined policy of notifying employees to return to work,17 requires an "unlawful"
condition as a prerequisite of reinstatement,' or clearly indicates that an application for reinstatement would be merely a
"futile gesture." 1'
Problems have frequently arisen in connection with the eligibility of strikers and their replacements to vote in collective
bargain elections conducted by the Board under Section 9. Regardless of whether or not a strike was caused by the employer's unfair labor practices, if the strike was still current,2' 0 the
strikers were eligible to vote.*' In the event the striker was
allegedly discharged for cause, he could cast a ballot subject
to being challenged. If challenged, the ballot would be impounded pending a determination of the discharge issue. In
situations where the strike was not caused by unfair labor
practices of the employer, replacement employees were formerly held not eligible to vote 22 but the Board has now re16 Matter of Foote and Davies, 66 N.L.R.B. 416 (1946); Matter of Rapid
Roller Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 557, 592 (1941); 3 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 78-80 (1938).
17 Matter of Western Felt Works, 10 N.L.R.B. 407, 426 (1938);
Matter of
Waterman Steamship Corporation, 7 N.L.R.B. 237, 250 (1938), enforced, 309 U.S.
206 (1940).
1 Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 903 (C.C.A. 8th,
1941); Matter of Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248, 265 (1936), enforced except as to back pay provisions 94 F. 2d 138 (C.C.A. 9th 1937), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 575 (1938), back pay provisions enforced, 99 F. 2d 533 (C.C.A. 9th 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 646 (1939).
19 Matter of Pinaud, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 235 (1943); Matter of Industrial Cotton
Mills Company, 50 N.L.R.B. 855, 869 (1943); Matter of Lone Star Gas Company,
18 N.L.R.B. 420, 455-456 (1939).
20 Matter of Lloyd Hollister, Inc., 68 N.L.R.B. 733 (1946).
21 11 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 21 (1946).
2 Matter of A. Sartorius & Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 493 (1938).
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versed its former decision and declared that bona fide replacement employees are eligible to cast ballots L, if made prior to
an unconditional application for reinstatement by the strikers.2 4 Whereas the Wagner Act was silent as to the eligibility
of strikers to vote, the amended Act expressly provides under
Section 9 (c) (3) :
"Employees on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement
shall not be eligible to vote."
It is apparent from the language of the Senate-House Conference Committee report that a change in the Board's eligibility rules should be affected by the amendment..21 The suggested change would tend to force or encourage employees to
submit to the procedures of the Board for redress from the
employer's unfair labor practices rather than to resort to
direct action; 2r however, in view of the Board's well established distinction between unfair labor practice strikers and
economic strikers, the legislative suggestion will present an
enigma to the Board. The question arises as to what is intended by the phrase "not entitled to reinstatement." If it is
held that all strikers upon being replaced are not entitled to
reinstatement and thus unable to vote, this places in the employer's hand a new powerful economic weapon. If the employer is able to employ any substantial number of replacements, they might challenge the union's majority status. Obviously, in many such cases the union would not continue to
represent a majority of those eligible to vote because of the
replacements; therefore, the strike may become illegal under
Section 8(b) (4) which denounces a strike to force any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization if another labor organization has been certified under
Section 9.
2:1Matter of Columbia Pictures Corporation, 64 N.L.R.B. 490 (1945) ; Matter
of 'Rudolph Wurlitzer Company, 32 N.L.R.B. 163 (1941); 10 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep.
23.24 (1945).
24 Matter of Kellburn Manufacturing Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 322 (1942);

also see
N.L.R.B. v. A. Sartorius & Co., 140 F. 2d 203, 206 (C.C.A. 2nd 1944).
25 H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 Cong. Rec. 6451, 6466 (June 3,
1947) provides: "The Senate amendment also contained a provision that employees on strike who were not entitled to reinstatement should not be permitted
to vote unless the strike involved an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer. This provision is also included in section 9 (c) of the conference agreement with the 'unless' clause omitted. The inclusion of such clause would have
had the effect of precluding the Board from changing its present practice with
respect to the treatment of 'unfair labor practice' strikers as distinguished from
that accorded to 'economic' strikers."
16 See H. R. Rep. No. 510, supra note 15.
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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EMPLOYEE FOR PARTICIPATION
IN STRIKE

With the exceptons hereinafter noted, under the Wagner Act
an employer could not terminate with immunity the employee

status of a striker for his participation in such concerted activity. Thus, with those exceptions, discharging or otherwise
discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of employment
or
any term or condition of employment of an employee
because of his concerted activity, - 7 including a strike, was violative of the National Labor Relations Act, and normally the
employee would be ordered reinstated with back pay. 28 The
discrimination might have taken the form of an outright dis2
charge or discrimination in reinstatement of the striker. 1
Either was equally violative of the Act if a means of reprisal
against the employee for his participation in the strike. An
outright discharge or other discrimination against an employee
as a means of reprisal for his activities in a strike would
appear to be equally violative of the amended Act if the strike
is consonant with the restricted protected strike activity as
subsequently discussed.
It is of no consequence that the strikers are members of a
union which is denied the use of the Board's procedures because of the union's failure to comply with Section 9(f), (g),
and (h) of the amended Act providing for the filing of certain anti-Communist affidavits by its officers, copies of its
constitution and by-laws and certain financial reports, since
under Section 10(b) of the amended Act and the Rules and
27 The term "concerted activities" has been accorded an extremely broad interpretation and has not been limited to situations in which the employees are
members of a union or the plant is organized since by discouraging concerted
activities, it has the necessary effect of discouraging membership in a labor
organization. N.L.R.B. v. Schwartz, 146 F. 2d 773 (C.C.A. 5th 1945); N.L.R.B. v.
Central Steel Tube Co., 139 F. 2d 489 (C.C.A. 8th 1943); Matter of Ever-Ready
Label Corporation, 54 N.L.R.B. 551 (1944). So under proper findings by the
Board, employees engaged in a so-called "wild cat" strike might receive remedies
under the Board procedures. Western Cartridge v. N.L.R.B., 139 F. 2d 855, 860
C.C.A. 7th 1944) (by implication).
28 N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F. 2d 919 (C.C.A. 2nd 1942); Great
Southern Trucking Co. v. N.L.R.B., 127 F. 2d 180 (C.C.A. 4th 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 652 (1942).
29 N.L.R.B. v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F. 2d 542, 547 (C.C.A. 10th
1944); N.L.R.B. v. Poultrymen's Service Corp., 138 F. 2d 204 (C.C.A. 3rd 1943).
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Regulations of the Board as amended :'a charge may be filed
by "any person." "
The Board is empowered under Section 10 (c) of the amended Act to order ". . . reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act." The
underlying theory upon which the Board orders reinstatement
with back pay to a striker who has suffered discriminatory
treatment is that it restores the status quo by placing the employee in the position he would have occupied but for the
employer's unlawful act and dissipates the coercive effect of
such discrimination on other employees. 3" The usual back pay
order requires that the employer make whole the dischargee
for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of respondent's discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum
of money equal to that which he normally would have earned
as wages from the date of the discrimination to the date of the
offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during said period.
Since the Board does not direct that monies be paid to a
discriminatorily discharged employee which he normally would
not have earned absent the discrimination, no problem is ordinarily presented if the discrimination is at the termination of
the strike resulting from a refusal to reinstate or discrimination in the reinstatement:; 3 However, where the employer improperly discharged an employee because of his participation
in the concerted activities during the course of an unfair labor
practice strike, the Board ordered backpay from the date of
the discharge to the date of the offer of reinstatement, reasoning:
"It is impossible to ascertain when the strikers would have
abandoned the strike and returned to work in the absence of
the respondent's action in discharging them. Had the respondent not discharged the strikers, their back pay would have
commenced from the date when they applied for work. However, by discharging them, the respondent made it useless for
the strikers to apply for their jobs. Since the uncertainty is
caused by the respondent's illegal act in discharging the strikers because of their union activity, we will indulge in no pre3029 CODE FED. REGS. § 203.9, as revised, effective Augsut 22, 1947; 2 CCH
Fed. Ad. Proc. 37, 501 (1947).
31 § 2(1) of the amended Act defines the term "person" as including "...
one
or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations,
legal representatives, trustees and trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers."
;;211 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 50 (1946); 6 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 73 (1941).
33N.L.R.B. v. Poultrymen's Service Corp., 138 F. 2d 204, 210 (C.C.A. 3rd
1943).
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sumption as to how long the strike might otherwise have

lasted."

34

But a discriminatorily discharged striker may toll the accrual of back pay and change his status from a dischargee to a
striking employee if he refuses an unconditional offer of reinstatement " or if by other evidence it is shown that he joins
the striking employees. But in the siutation where the strike
resulted in a complete shutdown of the employer's plant and
the strike was neither caused nor prolonged by any unfair
labor practices of the employer, the discharged employee was
denied backpay for the period of the strike."
The fact that an employer may not discharge the striking
employee has not prevented the employer from using economic
pressure in an effort to terminate the strike by acts and utterances not intended to effectuate discharges but primarily designed as a tactical maneuver designed to coerce the employees
into resuming work or to deter those remaining at work from
going out on strike. : 17 From the decided cases it is difficult to
determine the exact line between a so-called tactical discharge
and a discharge in fact. However, in making its determination the Board seems to consider evidence of the employer's
intention and the manner in which the strikers construe the
acts or statements. Thus in the Biles-Coleman case, :81 during a
strike by its employees the company placed an advertisement
in the newspaper stating "All. former employees of BilesColeman Lumber Company who were working on May 1st will
have to report to their foreman by 7:00 A.M. June 15, 1936.
After this date their jobs will be declared vacant and the
company will feel free to fill their positions with new men."
This was held not to constitute a discharge in fact. In the
American Manufacturing case," as the employees rang out
their cards to go on strike the foreman requested them to
surrender their time cards. The following morning when they
reported back to the plant and found their cards were not in
:!' Matter of El Paso Electric Company, 13 N.L.R.B. 213, 244 (1939), en forcd
119 F. 2d 581 (C.C.A. 5th 1941); accord, Matter of St. Marys Sewer Pipe Company, 54 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1944), eniforced, 146 F. 2d 995 (C.C.A. 3rd 1945); Matter of Industrial Cotton Mills Company, 50 N.L.R.B. 885 (1943).
3- Matter of Union Manufacturing Company, 63 N.L.R.B. 254 (1945).
36 Matter of Federal Engineering Company, 60 N.L.R.B. 592, 593 (1945),
enforced, 153 F. 2d 233 (C.C.A. 6th 1946).
37 Matter of Majestic Manufacturing Company, 64 N.L.R.B. 950 (1945); Matter of Rockwood Stove Works, 63 N.L.R.B. 1297 (1945).
:; Matter of Biles-Coleman Lumber Company, 4 N.L.R.B. 679, 701 (1937).
39 Matter of American Manufacturing Conccrn, 7 N.L.R.B. 753, 760 (1938).
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the rack, they left. Although such conduct was found to be
violative of Section 8 (1) of the Wagner Act, it was held to be
a mere "tactical step" and a use of the employer's economic
strength to force the employees to abandon their strike and
not a discharge.40
The amendments may be said to have little effect, as such,
on the above mentioned principles other than previously indicated where there is an unjustified discharge of or discrimination against the striking employee. Nevertheless, there has
been a definite trend on the part of the Board and especially
the courts to view with an increasingly critical eye strikes as a
medium for resolving disputes between labor and management.
Thus, there has been a progressive whittling away of the area
of protected collective activities, and the amendments indicate
legislative sanction of a further delimiting of this area by additional exceptions.
EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT AND THE PURPOSE OF THE STRIKE

While the wisdom or unwisdom of the employees and their
justification or lack of it in striking is generally considered
by the Board as immaterial under the Wagner Act in determining whether the strikers remain employees,4' certain misconduct during the course of the strike by the strikers has
been held to justify their discharge. The Supreme Court in the
Fansteel case,'2 declared that the Board had exceeded its authority in ordering reinstatement of strikers who had been
discharged for their seizure and violent retention of possession of their employer's plant in a so-called sit down strike
in defiance of state law and court order, although the employer
was guilty of unfair labor practices Which contributed to the
cause of the strike. The court through Chief Justice Hughes
rejected the Board's contention that by virtue of Section 2 (3)
of the Act the striking employees though discharged remained
employees by observing:
"We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of
40 But see National Laundry Company, 47 N.L.R.B. 961, 962 (1943).
4' For a detailed statement of the Board's rationale with respect to inquiring
into the justification of the strike, see Matter of American News Company, 55
N.L.R.B. 1302, 1306-1314 (1944). The courts have rejected attempts to equate
"illegal" with "unjustified" under the Wagner Act, Firth Carpet Co. v. N.L.R.B.
129 F. 2d 633, 636 (C.C.A. 2nd 1942).
42 N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
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their unlawful conduct,-to invest those who go on strike with
an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence
against the employer's property, which they would not have
enjoyed had they remained at work." 43
So unlawful mass picketing 44 or picketing in such a manner as to forceably deny their employer the right to go upon
his property which amounts to a seizure of the employer's
4'
property, justifies the discharge of the offending strikers.
But not all unlawful conduct during the course of the strikee.g. ordinary picket line disputes which are common to such
4
controversies-falls within the orbit of the Fansteeldoctrine. 3
47
Thus in the Republic Steel case, the court recognized that
certain unlawful conduct on the part of the strikers placed
them beyond the protective cover of the Wagner Act; nevertheless, it concluded:
"We think it must be conceded, however, that some disorder
is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn-out
strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic
weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are
stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words.
Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation
from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the
contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the
fight." 41
On several occasions, the courts have refused to accept the
Board's determination that a strike was in effect. While the
court recognized fully the employees' right to engage in a
43 Id. at 255. Accord, N.L.R.B. v. Clinchfield Coal Corporation, 145 F. 2d 66
(C.C.A. 4th 1944); McNeely & Price Co. v. N.L.R.B., 106 F. 2d 878 (C.C.A. 3rd
1939); Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. N.L.R.B., 97 F. 2d 531 (C.C.A. 4th 1938);
cf. N.L.R.B. v. Moore-Lowry Flour Mills Co., 122 F. 2d 419 (C.C.A. 10th 1941);
Stewart Die Casting Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 114 F. 2d 849 (C.C.A. 7th 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 680 (1941).
44 N.L.R.B. v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F. 2d 987 (C.C.A. 7th 1945).
45 N.L.R.B. v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F. 2d 566 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
46 N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F. 2d 874, 887 (C.C.A. 1st 1941),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941), holding that not every violation of local law by
the strikers is sufficient to justify a discharge or refusal to reinstate; N.L.R.B.
v. Elkland Leather Co., 114 F. 2d 221, 225 (C.C.A. 3rd 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 705 (1940); N.L.R.B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F. 2d 167 (C.C.A. 3rd
1939),cert. denied,.308 U.S. 605 (1939).
47 Republic Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 107 F. 2d 472 (C.C.A. 3rd 1939),
cert. denied on reinstatement question, 309 U.S. 684 (1940), modified on other
grounds, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
48 Id. at 479. Contra: Wilson & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 120 F. 2d 913, 924 (C.C.A. 7th
1941), in which the court states: ". . . there runs through the Board's argument
the covert guggestion that the unlawful activities were of such a minor character
that the participants were not deprived of any rights under the Act. Respect for
law and order demands the repudiation of such a suggestion. The effect of an
unprovoked assault can not be made dependent upon the size of the club with
which it is committed."
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strike by voluntarily leaving their work, the court refused to
find a strike in effect where the employees continued to work
and remained at their positions, accepted the wages paid to
them, and at the same time performed a selected part of their
allotted tasks and refused openly or secretly do so some other
work assigned to them. Under such circumstances, the employer's discharge of the employee was proper for the employee
49
had refused to obey the employer's reasonable instructions.
Other conduct of strikers, including their failure to observe
certain provisions of their valid collective bargaining contract, warrants the employer's termination of the employee's
service. Thus, where the employees were irrevocably committed not to observe and work in accordance with their contract,
the employer was at liberty to treat them as having severed
their relations with the company because of their breach
although their breach of the contract took the form of a
strike.5 1 Likewise, an employer may discharge or refuse to
reinstate employees who strike in violation of a "no-strike
pledge" in their contract where the employer has not breached
the contract.51
It is not entirely free from doubt as to the extent Section
8(d) of the amended Act will affect or be qualified by the
above mentioned principles; however, it would appear that
under this section an employer would be authorized to discharge employees for striking within the sixty day period
prior to termination or modification of the collective bargaining contract if the strike is directed toward or connected with
the termination or modification of the contract. Since Section
8(d) concerns the duty of the labor organization to bargain
collectively and indicates that the object thereof is to provide
an atmosphere conducive to a renewal or modification of the
contract, it is doubtful whether the section was intended to
be applicable beyond this-as where employer A's employees,
who are represented by union B under a collective bargaining
contract, strike for the express and sole purpose of forcing A
to settle a certain grievance in a particular manner and said
49 N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (C.C.A.
8th 1946);
N.L.R.B.v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F. 2d 262 (C.C.A. 6th 1945); C. G.
Conn, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 108 F. 2d 390 (C.C.A. 7th 1939).
50 N.L.R.B. v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
51 Matter of Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1947); Matter of
Scullin Steel Company, 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (194G); cf. Matter of Union City Body
Company, 69 N.L.R.B. 172 (1946).
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strike occurs within sixty days of the terminal date of the
contract and is unconnected with the termination or modification of the existing contract. It is also doubtful whether the
employer's failure to have "clean hands" will be admissible to
avoid operation of the section in cases falling within, its express meaning.'2
Standing in a rather isolated position is the decision of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Draper case," in which
it was held that the discharge of employees engaged in a socalled wild cat strike was not violative of either Section 8 (1) or
8 (3) of the Wagner Act where the employer had recognized a
bona fide union as the exclusive bargaining agent for all of
its employees, including the striking employees, and the employer stood willing to bargain with this union on the subject
matter of the strike. In that case the court appears to have
placed improper reliance on the BrashearFreight Lines case ',
for its decision, since the latter did not justify a discharge of
employees for striking but merely reiterated the well established principle that in an economic strike, the employer may
permanently replace the strikers. There the court did not find
that the striking union represented a majority of the employees, and therefore the employer did not commit an unfair
labor practice in refusing to bargain with the union. Hence,
the strike was not an unfair labor practice strike but an
economic strike. Under Section 8 (b) (3) of the amended Act,
it is now made an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to refuse to bargain; accordingly, it is possible that the
Board may now reach the same result but, of course, based
upon different reasoning."
In the Southern Steamship case,"' the Supreme Court held
that the Board had exceeded its authority in ordering reinstatement of certain striking seamen who had been discharged
as the result of a strike aboard ship which amounted to mutiny
52 In the Scullin Steel case, supra note 51, the Board makes express reference
to the company's non breach of the collective bargaining agreement. On the other
hand, the Supreme Court in the Fansteel case refused to consider the employer's
conduct in determining that the strikers engaged in "unlawful concerted activities."
5s N.L.R.B. v. Draper Corporation, 145 F. 2d 199 (C.C.A. 4th 1944).
54 N.L.R.B. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 119 F. 2d 379 (C.C.A. 8th 1941).
55 See subsequent discussion as to effect on protected concerted activities of
striking employees' participation in violation of subdivisions of § 8(b) of the
amended Act. For a marked extension of the Draper case see N.L.R.B. v. Reynolds
International Pen Co., 162 F. 2d 680 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
56 Southern Steamship Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
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in viloation of certain federal statutes and the court, speaking
through Justice Byrnes, admonished the Board:
"...
the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate
the policies of the National Labor Relations Act so singleminded that it may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of
Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one
statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand
of an administrative body that it undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task." '
In a subsequent case where the employees, after agreeing
through their union on a wage increase with the employer and
making a joint application to the National War Labor Board,
struck to force their employer td grant the wage increase
without following the procedure prescribed by the National
War Labor Board, thus subjecting the employer to criminal
penalties for violating the Wage Stabilization Act if he acceded to their demands, the Board determined that such employees were not entitled to reinstatement in view of the illegal
purpose of the strike.;-" The majority of the Board after reviewing the legislative history of the Act reasoned:
"... we think it most improbable that the Congress meant
to invest this Board, or the courts reviewing our action, with
any broad discretion to determine what we or the courts might
choose to consider the proper objectives of concerted activity
. . . we think it most unlikely that Congress intended to
exclude from the concerted activities protected by Section 7
all conduct deemed tortious under state rules of decision or
statutes, or city ordinances, merely because of the objective
sought to be accomplished. . . . It is quite another matter,
however, to suggest that Congress either in 1935 or 1942,
intended us to ignore the character of a strike knowingly
prosecuted to compel an acknowledged violation of an act of
the Congress itself." 31
Shortly thereafter the Board indicated its determination
restrict the application of the American News doctrine to
very facts. Thus, in the Indiana Desk case,'0° the discharge
employees for striking in an effort to force the employer
57 Id. at 47.
58 Matter of American News Company, 55 N.L.R.B. 1302

to
its
of
to

(1944).
Id. at 1312. The Board noted with emphasis that the preamble of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 declared that ". . . It shall be the policy of . . .
the National Labor Relations Board . . . to work toward a stabilization of prices,
fair and equitable wages, and cost of production." 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C.
§ 901 (1942).
CO Matter of Indiana Desk Company, 58 N.L.R.B. 48 (1944). Order Denying
Respondent's Petition For Modification of Board's Decision and Order.
59
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agree to a wage increase was found to be violative of the Act
since the strike was not precipitated by an unlawful demand
that the agreed wage increase be put into effect prior to approval by the War Labor Board, and because wages characteristically have been within the scope of collective bargaining
and the Wage Stabilization Act did not render collective bargaining obsolete.-' The circuit court of appeals in refusing
enforcement of the Board's order indicated that it was not
impressed by the Board's distinction between a strike to force
agreement to a wage increase and a strike to force agreement
and putting it into effect.62
On other occasions the Board has been confronted with the
responsibility of determining what accommodation must be
made between the Act and other Congressional objectives.
Thus, it ruled that striking employees, members of a union
which had failed to file certain notices with the Secretary of
Labor, the National War Labor Board and the National Labor
Relations Board as required by the War Labor Disputes Act,
were not thereby removed from the protective pale of the
Act."' The majority of the Board were of the opinion that the
conduct of the strikers was not to be condoned but concluded:
"... that the Congress did not intend specifically, or generally as part of its legislative policy, that the rights of employees, whether they be rank and file or representatives,
under the National Labor Relations Act be affected by the War

Labor Disputes Act."

G4

Finally, the restriction of greatest magnitude under the
amended Act on the right to strike is imposed by Section
8 (b) (4) " , which provides inter alia that it shall be an unfair
labor practice on the part of a labor organization or its agents
to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to perform services where the object thereof is:
(A) to force any employer or self-employed person to join
CI Accord, Matter of Union-Buffalo Mills Company, 58 N.L.R.B. 384 (1944);
cf. Matter of Rockwood Stove Works, 63 N.L.R.B. 1297 (1945).
G2 N.L.R.B. v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F. 2d 987, 993 (C.C.A. 7th 1945).
63 Hamilton v. N.L.R.B., 160 F. 2d 465, 471 (C.C.A. 6th 1947), cert. denied, sub.
norm. Kalamazoo Stationery Co. v. N.L.R.B., 68 S. Ct. 65 (1947); Matter of Union
City Body Company, 69 N.L.R.B. 172 (1946); Matter of Republic Steel Corporation (98" Strip Mill), 62 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1945).
64 Matter of Republic Steel Corporation (98" Strip Mill), 62 N.L.R.B. 1008,
1026 (1945).
65 A similar restriction may arise in connection with the other unfair labor
practices of unions under § 8(b) of the amended Act where the union commits the
unfair labor practice through the medium of a strike.
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any labor or employer organization or any employer to cease
using the products of or doing business with any other person; or (B) to force any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization unless such labor organization
has been certified under Section 9; or, (C) to force any employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization if
another labor organization has been certified under Section 9;
or (D) to force any employer to assign particular work to
employees in a particular labor organization, trade, craft or
class rather than any other group or employees unless the employer is failing to conform to an order of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work. Under the Wagner Act, the Board distinguished
between strikes which had as their objective to force another
party to violate the Act- and strikes with merely parallel
the remedies of the Act by seeking to obtain an objective which
might also be obtained through the use of the Board's procedures.0 7 The unfair labor practices referred to in all of the
subdivisions of Section 8(b) and especially Section 8(b) (4)
relate only to conduct which is attributable to a labor organization or its agents, and the legislative history appears to
be clear that the objectives circumscribed by Section 8(b) (4)
are not within the legitimate field of concerted activities when
employees strike to accomplish one of the proscribed objects
and the strike is part of an unfair labor practice.6 s However,
a question is raised where a group of employees strike to
accomplish one of the objectives specified in Section 8(b) (4)
but do so on their own initiative, so that no union or its agents
can be found to have encouraged or induced their act. Unless
the group is found by their collective activity to constitute a
labor organization, there would be no unfair labor practice
since the subdivisions of Section 8 (b) are inapplicable to individuals unless they are agents of a labor organization or collectively constitute a labor organization. Assuming that no
such finding is made, the question is posed in connection with
strikes for one of these proscribed purposes whether the
sphere of unprotected concerted activities includes only those
GOMatter of Thompson Products, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947).
67 Matter of Columbia Pictures Corporation, 64 N.L.R.B. 490 (1945).
6s Compare N.L.R.B. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F. 2d
503, 506 (C.C.A. 2nd 1942), in which Justice Learned Hand under the Wagner Act
held that a sympathetic strike or secondary boycott was concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection within the scope of § 7 of the Act.
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situations where the facts involved spell out participation in
an unfair labor practice or also includes situations where the
object of the strike is circumscribed without regard to proof
of an unfair labor practice. The former is clear but if the
latter is true, it is patent while the amendments were primarily intended to place restrictions upon labor organizations,
the restrictive effect upon individual employees who participate in a work stoppage is more inclusive than that imposed
on the labor organization. The legislative history suggests
that the answer is in the negative; thus the House bill 1;"stated
specifically that the rights of employees under Section 7 of
the amended Act did not include the right to commit or participate in unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, or violations of collective bargaining contracts. The subsequent Senate-House conference which eliminated this express provision did so not because of any disagreement with
the House policy or in an effort to avoid restriction of the
sphere of protected concerted activities but because as the conference report stated:
". .. it was believed that the specific provisions in the
House bill excepting unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, and the violation of collective bargaining
agreements from the protection of section 7 were unnecessary.
Moreover, there was real concern that the inclusion of such a
provision might have a limiting effect and make improper
conduct not specifically mentioned subject to the protection of

the Act."

70

That employees who engage in strikes constituting an integral part of an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (b) and
especially subdivision 4 are engaged in unprotected concerted
activities is further emphasized by another statement in the
conference report:
".... it is made an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7, it is apparent that
many forms and varieties of, concerted activities which the
Board, particularly in its early days, regarded as protected
by the act will no longer be treated as having that protection,
since obviously persons who engage in or support unfair labor
practices will not enjoy immunity under the act.", I
r9 House Bill H. R. 3020 passed the House of Representatives on April 17, 1947,
by a vote of 308 to 107.
70 H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., 93 Cong. Rec. 6451, 6462 (June 3,
1947).
N Id. at 6463.
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CONCLUSION

It may be concluded that the basic right of employees to
engage in a strike remains but that the field for which economic warfare in the form of a strike may be used as a means
of obtaining certain -objectives has been restricted by the specific amendments of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 and by Congressional acquiescence in the present trend
of Board and judicial construction. Likewise, the action of
the strikers in invoking the strike and their conduct during the
course of the strike can be said safely to be subject to increasing scrutiny. Thus, there is a constant raising of the standards
to be observed by the participating strikers; and the strikers,
as individual employees, are charged with new responsibilities. For the striker who falls short, the penalty is justification
for his discharge or other disciplinary action.

